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The IEEE-SA Revised Patent Policy and
Its Definition of “Reasonable” Rates: A
Transatlantic Antitrust Divide?
Nicolas Petit*
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association’s (“IEEE-SA”) updated patent policy and a business review
letter issued by the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have
caused much discussion in the United States. The purpose of this Article
is to assess whether a similarly lenient antitrust approach to Standard
Setting Organizations’ (“SSOs”) rate-setting policies would prevail
under the European Union’s (“EU”) competition rules. Recent EU
competition case law has promoted a very hard line in the area of coordinated conduct. Cases such as Dole Food Company, Inc. v. European
Commission, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van
de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, and Expedia, Inc. v. Autorité de la concurrence have expanded the scope of the per se prohibition
rule found in article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) to forms of horizontal coordination with less
than obvious anticompetitive potential, such as “cheap-talk” pre-pricing
communication (Dole Food Company), episodic collusion (T-Mobile),
and horizontal agreements with limited market coverage (Expedia).
Those judgments, and others, share a common rationale—that of deterring any coordinated interference with the price system. In the EU
courts’ view, joint interference by competitors with the price system seems
to be a sin in itself, regardless of actual or potential market effects. Horizontal coordination is thus increasingly prohibited on its incipiency, and
punished as a means to set an example. From an enforcement standpoint, this trend in the case law has pros (lower enforcement costs) and
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cons (deters pro-competitive coordination). But, perhaps more importantly, it has a major normative implication, which is that it raises the
antitrust risk for all forms of coordination, including arrangements of
the type found in the IEEE-SA updated patent policy. This Article explains that the antitrust risk generated by SSOs rate-setting policies is
presumably higher in the European Union than in the United States,
where the case law on horizontal coordination is less stringent.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article offers a preliminary assessment of the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association’s
(“IEEE-SA”) revised patent policy under European Union
(“EU”) antitrust law and, in particular, under the rules prohibiting
unlawful anticompetitive coordination provided in article 101 of the
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).1 In
February 2015, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
issued a business review letter (“BRL”), which concluded that the
IEEE-SA revised patent policy did not deserve a challenge under
the United States’ antitrust rules, short of “likely harm to competition” and to the extent that its potential procompetitive benefits
likely outweighed any possible harm.2 This Article argues that a
similar degree of forbearance might not have been possible if the
analysis of the sections of the IEEE-SA revised patent policy related to the definition of “reasonable rates” had been conducted
under EU competition law. This is because the case law of EU
courts attaches cartel-type liability under TFEU article 101 to any
coordinated interference with the price system, and this creates a
risk of antitrust liability for licensing guidelines of the kind set out
in the IEEE-SA revised patent policy.
To be clear, this Article does not argue that the IEEE-SA revised patent policy falls foul of TFEU article 101 as a possible form
of horizontal buyer collusion, as previously argued by some authors,3 but instead that it may plausibly give rise to EU antitrust
exposure on the mere ground that it interferes with the free market
price system. This Article then proceeds to explore the reasons
that underpin the strict liability standard which prevails in EU
competition law. It finds that the incipiency theory provides a possible ex post rationalization for the affirmation of cartel-type liability
under TFEU article 101 for coordinated interferences with the
price system. The Article concludes by arguing that antitrust agencies’ invitations to Standard Setting Organizations (“SSOs”) to
adopt rules designed to rein in the alleged market power of standard-essential patent (“SEP”) holders through private ordering
1

See IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws: Approved Clause 6 of the SASB Bylaws, IEEE
STANDARDS ASS’N, https://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/approvedchanges.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S6M-ME4D] (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
2
See Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Michael A. Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter BRL] (on
file with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal).
3
See J. Gregory Sidak, The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential
Patents, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 48, 56–60 (2015) [hereinafter Sidak, Antitrust Division]. See
generally J. Gregory Sidak, Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard-Setting
Organizations, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON 123 (2009).
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mechanisms may eventually bring them within the strictures of
TFEU article 101, thereby creating an antitrust trap.
To show this, the Article proceeds in three steps. Part I describes the changes introduced by the IEEE-SA revised patent policy in relation to the definition and calculation of “reasonable
rates.” Part II reviews EU case law under TFEU article 101, and
demonstrates that the EU courts have progressively elaborated a
strict rule of liability that outlaws any coordinated interferences
with the price system. Part III explains that the inimicality toward
coordinated interference with the price system observed in the case
law may be rationalized on the basis of the “incipiency theory.”
Finally, Part IV concludes that private ordering institutions like
SSOs have less margin of maneuver under EU competition law to
remedy perceived concerns of patent holdup than what the BRL
suggests is the case under U.S. antitrust law.
At this stage, some qualifications are in order. This Article only
covers the changes introduced by the IEEE-SA revised patent policy in relation to the concept of “reasonable rates.” It does not discuss other changes introduced by the IEEE-SA revised patent policy, such as restrictions on the availability of prohibitive orders, duty to license at all levels of production, rules on reciprocity, and
grant backs. Moreover, the Article does not investigate the allegations of collusive conduct that were leveled at some members of
IEEE-SA during the process that led to the development of the revised patent policy.
From a methodological standpoint, the analysis is primarily
conducted on the basis of the case law of the Court of Justice of the
EU (“CJEU”) and the General Court (“GC”). The Article deliberately leaves aside the policy documents and soft law instruments
adopted by the European Commission (“the Commission”) in this
field. There are two reasons for this conservative approach. First,
the judgments of the EU courts in Expedia, Inc. v. Autorité de la concurrence, and Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet (“Post Danmark II”) have emphasized the inability of Commission soft law
instruments to have binding effects on third parties, courts, and
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agencies.4 Second, the formal and substantive validity of those instruments has not been tested before the EU Courts, and they can
therefore not be deemed to provide a definitive and authoritative
interpretation of the EU competition rules.
I. REASONABLE RATES UNDER THE IEEE-SA REVISED
PATENT POLICY
A. Overview of the IEEE-SA Revised Patent Policy
In the past decade, several important SSOs active in information technologies have internally discussed changes to their patent
policies.5 Within those SSOs, the demand for patent policy reform
invariably originates from participants who are net technology buyers, and are based on concerns of alleged patent “holdup” by other
SSO participants who are net technology sellers.6 Calls for SSOs to
take action against such perceived evils have also been fueled by
external declarations from two of the world’s most influential antitrust agencies—the U.S. DOJ and the Commission7—who seem to

4

Case C-23/14, Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet, ¶ 52 (Oct. 6, 2015),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=169191&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=54286 [https://perma.cc/8LPJWCTJ]; Case C-226/11, Expedia, Inc. v. Autorité de la concurrence, ¶¶ 4, 12 (Dec. 13,
2012),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=131804&
pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=54095
[https://
perma.cc/42YR-BHU9].
5
The issue has also been discussed within other SSOs active in the wireless
communications industries, like the International Telecommunications Union (“ITU”)
and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”). To date, no other
SSO has yet introduced changes similar to those found in IEEE-SA revised patent policy.
6
The idea is that SEP holders use threats of injunctions to force firms to pay more.
This theory can be traced back to Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro. See generally Mark
A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991
(2007); Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
280 (2010).
7
See Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Six “Small”
Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch, Remarks as Prepared for the ITU-T Patent Roundtable
9–10 (Oct. 10, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518951/download [https://
perma.cc/34KF-5JJJ]. In Europe, see Information Note from the Eur. Comm’n Enter. &
Indus. Directorate-Gen., to the Member States Standardisation Comm. 3 (Oct. 7, 2014)
(on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal).
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have accepted the patent holdup theory.8 Proposals for SSO reform
have generally consisted of spelling out in further detail the implications of Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (“FRAND”)
commitments made by SEP holders.9 FRAND commitments are
voluntary, irrevocable assurances given by standard participants
that they are prepared to grant licenses on fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory terms for their patents that become essential to
the implementation of a standard.10
In this context, the IEEE-SA has been a pioneer. The IEEE-SA
is one of the world’s largest SSOs.11 It operates in the electrical and
information technologies sectors, and it is well known for the successful introduction of several cutting-edge wireless communications standards, including IEEE 802.11 (better known as Wi-Fi).12
8

Further, they have waved the red scarf of antitrust intervention against SEP holders
as an exceptional, last resort perspective. See, e.g., Joaquín Almunia, Vice President of
Eur. Comm’n Responsible for Competition Policy, Address at the IP Summit: Intellectual
Property and Competition Policy (Dec. 9, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_SPEECH-13-1042_en.htm [https://perma.cc/F7P6-FTKY]. The speech
discussed the need to take action to remove injunctions when there is a willing licensee:
“Ideally, this principle should be implemented by the standard-setting [organizations]
themselves. But since that is not happening, I am willing to provide clarity to the market
through competition enforcement.” Id.
9
This includes limiting their fundamental right to seek injunctive relief.
10
For a definition, see ETSI Rules of Procedure: Annex 6: ETSI Intellectual Property
Rights Policy, EUR. TELECOMM. STANDARDS INST. ¶ 6.1 (Apr. 20, 2016), http://
www.etsi.org/images/files/ipr/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQW4-5GHH].
11
IEEE-SA has members from more than 160 countries, including members from
corporations, government agencies, and academic institutions. See IEEE at a Glance,
INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS, https://www.ieee.org/about/today/
at_a_glance.html [https://perma.cc/U8MN-6U6S] (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
12
Id. Within the IEEE-SA, individual technical committees (also known as working
groups) develop industrial standards, which are then subject to ballot approval by the
IEEE-SA Standards Board. See How Are Standards Made?, IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N,
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/process.html [https://perma.cc/FVJ3-MFXX] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2016). One of the groups is the IEEE 802 LAN/MAN Standards
Committee, which presents itself as the world leader standard development body in
wireless communications technologies. See IEEE 802 LAN/MAN STANDARDS
COMMITTEE, http://www.ieee802.org [https://perma.cc/3CF5-VYSL] (last Nov. 19,
2016). For general information about IEEE 802, see Roger B. Marks, Ian C. Gifford &
Bob O’Hara, Standards in IEEE 802 Unleash the Wireless Internet, 2 IEEE MICROWAVE
MAG. 46 (2001), http://www.ieee802.org/16/docs/01/80216c-01_10.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2EE5-PDCL]. Further, the IEEE-SA Standards Board is assisted by a Patent
Committee (“PatCom”), which, in particular, receives, considers, and accepts FRAND
Letters of Assurances (“LOAs”). See IEEE-SA Records of IEEE Standards-Related Patent
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On February 8, 2015, the IEEE-SA announced an update of its
patent policy.13 The revised patent policy’s stated aim is to provide
“[g]reater [c]larity of [m]eaning on ‘[r]easonable’ [r]ate[s],”14 following unsuccessful previous attempts to reduce the “inherent vagueness” of FRAND commitments given by SEP holders.15 Readers familiar with the field will recall that, in 2007, the IEEE-SA
tried to address the issue by adopting a patent policy that expressly
permitted a patent holder to disclose its proposed maximum rates
and other terms in a Letter of Assurances (“LOA”). In practice,
the experience under the 2007 policy was a failure.16 The IEEE-SA

Letters of Assurance, IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD: PATCOM, https://standards.ieee.org/
about/sasb/patcom/patents.html [https://perma.cc/5VWG-XJQT] (last visited Nov. 19,
2016). PatCom is also in charge of proposing changes to the IEEE patent policy. Id.
13
On December 6, 2014, the IEEE Board of Directors approved revisions to section 6
of the IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws. See IEEE Statement Regarding Updating of Its
Standards-Related Patent Policy, INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS (Feb. 8,
2015),
https://www.ieee.org/about/news/2015/8_february_2015.html
[https://
perma.cc/B2T7-PQAL] [hereinafter IEEE Statement]. Those changes took effect on
March 15, 2015. See Understanding Patent Issues During IEEE Standards Development,
IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N 22 (Sept. 1, 2015), http://standards.ieee.org/faqs/patents.pdf
[https://perma.cc/428S-TMLS] [hereinafter Understanding Patent Issues].
14
See Letter from Michael A. Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP, to William J.
Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 15 (Sept. 30, 2014) [hereinafter
Request] (on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law
Journal). In addition to providing guidance on the meaning of “reasonable rate,” the
updated patent policy: (i) clarifies that compliant implementations cover both end-use
products and components or sub-assemblies, and that FRAND commitment indistinctly
apply to all; (ii) restricts the availability of injunction or exclusion orders to patent holders
to circumstances where the implementer fails to comply with the outcome of third-party
judicial proceedings over FRAND-setting disputes, invalidity, enforceability, essentiality
and infringement, and damages; and (iii) confirms that SEP holders can seek to benefit
from grant backs on the licensee’s SEPs and non-SEPs. See IEEE-SA Standards Board
Bylaws, supra note 1.
15
Request, supra note 14, at 10; see also Konstantinos Karachalios, Managing Dir.,
IEEE Standards Ass’n, Keynote Address at IEEE SIIT: “If It Works (For Me), Why Fix
It?” Status Quo Versus Reforms at the Intersection Between the Patent System and
Standardization (Oct. 6, 2015). The address described the problem with the FRAND
commitment concept: “To be clear, the problem is not the relative ambiguity of an
incomplete contract, since most useful contracts include several levels and degrees of
ambiguity. It is the total ambiguity of the basic definitions that makes such a contract
totally vague and, thus, potentially tricky for the ones lured in it.” Id.
16
This seems recognized even by proponents of such policies. See, e.g., Konstantinos
Karachalios Fundamental Uncertainty at the Intersection Between Patents and Standards,
PATENT LAWYER, Nov.–Dec. 2015, at 33.
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only received two LOAs in which patent holders accepted to disclose maximum rates.17
The 2015 revised patent policy has more teeth. It introduces a
definition of a “reasonable rate” that applies to all patent holders
that make an early FRAND commitment in an accepted LOA.18
Under the adopted definition, reasonable rate means “appropriate
compensation to the patent holder for the practice of an Essential
Patent Claim excluding the value, if any, resulting from the inclusion of that Essential Patent Claim’s technology in the IEEE standard.”19 In other words, an SEP holder that makes a FRAND declaration commits that it will not charge royalties up to the value
implementers would incur to switch technologies.20 The definition
of a “reasonable rate” is mandatory in the sense that it applies to
all essential patent claims for which the IEEE-SA has an accepted
LOA. It is, however, not mandatory in the sense that patent holders can still avoid to give a FRAND commitment and nonetheless
participate in the standard-setting activities of IEEE-SA.21
In addition, the IEEE-SA updated patent policy recommends
the consideration of three “factors” in the determination of reasonable rates during licensing negotiations.22 Under the first factor,
the rate should reflect the value contributed by the SEP-protected
invention to the “value of the relevant functionality of the smallest
saleable compliant implementation” of the SEP.23 According to the
BRL, this factor is designed to ensure that the royalty correctly reflects the added value of the patented invention, and nothing
more.24 It would prevent SEP holders from free riding on other end
product features to extract unreasonable royalties, which might oc-

17

See Request, supra note 14, at 10.
See IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, supra note 1, at 2.
19
Id.
20
See Understanding Patent Issues, supra note 13, at 13 (“A Reasonable Rate does not
include value arising from the cost or inability of implementers to switch from the
Essential Patent Claim’s technology included in the standard.”).
21
See IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, supra note 1, at 2.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See BRL, supra note 2, at 12–13. It is also often referred to as the smallest saleable
patent-practicing unit (“SSPU”) requirement.
18
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cur when the end product is complex and runs on many patented
technologies.25
Under the second factor, account shall be given to the relative
value contributed by the SEP to the smallest saleable compliant
implementation “in light of the value contributed by all Essential
Patent Claims for the same IEEE Standard practiced in that Compliant Implementation.”26 The stated rationale behind the second
factor is to mitigate “royalty stacking” risks, when SEP holders fail
to consider the adverse cumulative effect of their royalty demands
on the aggregate price for the standardized technology.27
Finally, the third factor recommends considering “[e]xisting licenses covering use of the same Essential Patent Claim,” provided
they are “comparable” and were not obtained under the “threat of
a Prohibitive Order.”28 Possible benchmarks include licensing
terms entered into following voluntary negotiations or granted by
courts in the context of assessing damages during litigation.29
A degree of ambiguity persists on the binding nature of the
three factors articulated in the IEEE-SA updated patent policy. On
the one hand, the text emphatically prescribes that the “determination of reasonable rates should include, but need not be limited to,
the consideration of” the three factors identified, suggesting that
they constitute a core set of pricing rules.30 On the other hand, the
Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”) issued by the IEEE-SA
explain that the revised patent policy simply “recommends” but
does not require the consideration of the three factors, suggesting
that they constitute mere pricing guidelines.31 The remainder of
this Article relies on the latter reading in view of the fact that an
SEP holder that is unwilling to submit a FRAND commitment can
nonetheless continue to participate in IEEE-SA standards devel25

Id. at 12. This is without, however, excluding the possibility of charging royalties
expressed in terms of a share of the end-product price (end-product royalties).
26
See IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, supra note 1, at 2.
27
See BRL, supra note 2, at 13.
28
See IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, supra note 1, at 2.
29
See BRL, supra note 2, at 13 n.48.
30
See IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, supra note 1, at 2.
31
See Understanding Patent Issues, supra note 13, at 15 (“While the IEEE-SA Patent
Policy recommends considerations for use in determining a Reasonable Rate, these
considerations are not mandatory.”); see also Request, supra note 14, at 18.
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opment activities.32 That said, it is obvious that the former reading
of the patent policy would have even more serious implications
from an antitrust standpoint than the ones described in later sections.
B. Development of the IEEE-SA Revised Patent Policy and the DOJ
Business Review Letter
The process that led to the adoption of the IEEE-SA revised
patent policy was both protracted and controversial.33 Four drafts
of the updated patent policy were published for public review and
comment.34 A flood of comments was received.35 The definition
and calculation of reasonable rates proved particularly contentious.
A debate occurred between technology developing firms, desirous
to maintain flexibility in ex post licensing negotiations, and technology implementing firms, intent on limiting ex ante the bargaining power of SEP holders through a stricter definition of
FRAND.36 In most consensus-driven SSOs, such a divide would
have been fatal to the proposed policy changes. However, a distinguishing feature of IEEE-SA is that it appears to be able to adopt
such modifications under majority vote. In August 2014, the IEEESA Standards Board eventually adopted the updated version following a fourteen-to-five vote.37
In the course of its development, the revised patent policy gave
rise to possible concerns of antitrust liability.38 Communications
32

See Understanding Patent Issues, supra note 13, at 9 (stating that submitting a LOA is
“not a precondition to participation”).
33
For a comprehensive description, see Nicolo Zingales & Olia Kanevskaia, The IEEESA Patent Policy Update Under the Lens of EU Competition Law, EUR. COMPETITION J.
(Nov. 23, 2016), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17441056.2016.1254482
[https://perma.cc/4GAR-YKZD].
34
Id. at 18.
35
Id.
36
See David Crouch, Battle Over IP Rights Could Hold Back Next-Generation Technology,
FIN. TIMES (June 11, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/30cfde18-ffa5-11e4-bc3000144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/W5M3-QQ45].
37
See IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N, IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD MEETING MINUTES—
http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/0814sasbmin.pdf
[https://
AUGUST 2014,
perma.cc/2KPA-YF4J].
38
See PATENT COMM. OF THE IEEE-SA STANDARDS BD., IEEE-SA PATENT POLICY—
19TH NOV 2013 DRAFT COMMENTS 18 (Mar. 4, 2014), http://grouper.ieee.org/
groups/pp-dialog/drafts_comments/PatCom_sort_by_commentID_040314.pdf
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technology company Ericsson argued that the reasonable rate definition could lead to “the collective establishment of mandatory,
uniform license terms that will reduce the compensation for standard essential patents, akin to a buyer’s side cartel.”39 In a letter to
the DOJ,40 J. Gregory Sidak, a well-known antitrust scholar and
consultant, expressed concerns that the proposed “amendments
posed a serious risk of violating section 1 of the Sherman Act by
facilitating tacit or explicit collusion among implementers to suppress the royalties they pay for SEPs.”41
Arguably to appease those concerns, the IEEE-SA requested a
BRL from the DOJ.42 On February 2, 2015, the DOJ officially
stated in a BRL that it had no intention to challenge the IEEE-SA
revised patent policy under the antitrust rules.43 The DOJ’s BRL is
a succinct policy statement that is relatively devoid of analytical
content. The exercise conducted by the DOJ essentially consisted
in assessing whether the revised patent policy would “harm competition by anticompetitively reducing royalties and thereby diminishing incentives to innovate.”44 Two general considerations
seem to underpin the DOJ’s decision to dismiss antitrust charges.
First, the DOJ observed that the IEEE-SA revised policy could not
have any bearing on the setting of royalty rates which “ultimately
are determined through bilateral negotiations.”45 Second, the DOJ
stressed that both the definition of reasonable rates and the three
pricing factors remain optional.46 It insisted, in particular, on the
[https://perma.cc/3F3H-BSH4] [hereinafter IEEE-SA DRAFT COMMENTS]; see also Ron
D. Katznelson, IEEE-USA Intellectual Prop. Comm., Presentation at IEEE San Diego
Section: Will New IEEE Standards Incorporate Patented Technologies Under the
Proposed Patent Policy? (Dec. 23, 2014), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
filename=0&article=1091&context=rkatznelson&type=additional
[https://perma.cc/
BP2S-TNLP].
39
IEEE-SA DRAFT COMMENTS, supra note 38, at 15–16. This comment was made by
D. Kallay of Ericsson in the context of discussing retroactive application. Id.
40
Letter from J. Gregory Sidak, Chairman, Criterion Economics LLC, to Renata
Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 28, 2015) (on file with
the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal).
41
See Sidak, Antitrust Division, supra note 3, at 51.
42
See Request, supra note 14, at 1.
43
See BRL, supra note 2, at 1.
44
Id. at 8.
45
Id.
46
See id. at 11–12.
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fact that “patent holders can avoid the updated IEEE RAND
Commitment and still participate in standards-setting activities at
IEEE-SA.”47
In a section specifically dedicated to the IEEE-SA definition of
“reasonable rates,” the BRL considered possible justifications for
the revised patent policy.48 It noted that the mandatory definition
reduced the possibility that SEP holders will “hold up implementers of a standard and obtain higher prices . . . than would have
been possible before the standard was set.”49 In relation to the
three factors, the BRL cited a variety of patent—not antitrust—
case law references to denote that the revised patent policy is consistent with judicial precedent.50 The DOJ concluded its BRL on an
optimistic note, stating that the IEEE-SA revised patent policy will
“benefit competition and consumers by facilitating licensing negotiations, mitigating hold up and royalty stacking, and promoting
competition among technologies for inclusion in standards.”51
The adoption of the BRL has not extinguished the controversy
surrounding the IEEE-SA revised patent policy—much to the contrary. Technology developing firms with significant patent positions have complained that the IEEE-SA revised patent policy is
skewed toward technology implementers,52 and firms have threat-

47

Id. at 8. This particular point is the subject of dispute. While the IEEE-SA has
submitted to the DOJ that the changes could be bypassed, the IEEE-SA has continued to
label them as a “clarification” of its patent policy, which tends to suggest that they are
mandatory. See generally Request, supra note 14. The technology firm InterDigital has
criticized this confusion, and suggested that this could lead to the inapplicability of the
DOJ’s business review letter. See Letter from Lawrence F. Shay, Exec. Vice President,
Intellectual Prop., InterDigital, to David Law, Patent Comm. Chair, IEEE-SA Standards
Board Patent Comm. 2 (Mar. 24, 2015) [hereinafter InterDigital Letter] (on file with the
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal).
48
See BRL, supra note 2, at 11–14.
49
Id. at 12.
50
Id. at 11–12.
51
Id. at 16.
52
This has been confirmed by a subsequent econometric analysis carried out by Sidak,
which “reveals a biased treatment of substantive comments submitted to the IEEE by
members opposed to the controversial revisions.” See J. Gregory Sidak, Testing for Bias to
Suppress Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 1 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 301, 303
(2016). According to Sidak, this “bias suggests that [decision-making] at the IEEE was
controlled by parties that seek to devalue SEPs.” Id.
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ened to reconsider their participation in the IEEE-SA under the
revised patent policy.53
Some scholars have also leveled trenchant critiques at the BRL.
Sidak argued that the DOJ has applied a “laxer standard to the risk
of collusion over the prices that buyers will pay for SEPs” than the
standard usually applied “over the prices that the very same buyers
will pay for other kinds of essential inputs.”54 Legal scholars Thomas A. Lambert and Alden F. Abbott analogized the IEEE-SA revised patent policy to an “illegal monopsony buyer cartel,” and
decried the DOJ’s policy under the BRL as “perverse antitrust policy” which “threatens to raise Type II error costs.”55
II. COORDINATED INTERFERENCE WITH THE PRICE SYSTEM
AS A RESTRICTION BY OBJECT UNDER TFEU ARTICLE 101
This Article submits that an antitrust agency would have
reached a conclusion opposite to that reached by the DOJ had it
conducted its analysis under EU antitrust standards. SSOs’ attempts to clarify the concept of “reasonable rates” are likely to
give rise to antitrust liability under TFEU article 101 without the
need to adduce further facts. The basis for this contention is that,
through the years, the case law handed down by the CJEU under
TFEU article 101 has evolved to attach cartel-type antitrust liability
to any coordinated interference with the free market price system.
The following sections review this case law, explore its normative
53

Those companies include Nokia, Ericsson, Qualcomm, and InterDigital, among
others. See Crouch, supra note 36; see also InterDigital Letter, supra note 47; Bill Merritt,
Why We Disagree with the IEEE’s Patent Policy, EETIMES (Mar. 27, 2015, 7:00 AM),
http://www.eetimes.com/author.asp?doc_id=1326144&section_id=36
[https://
perma.cc/KR53-NYH6] (“A handful of manufacturers of devices—the people who pay
for the use of the technology—essentially co-opted the IEEE patent committee.”).
54
See Sidak, Antitrust Division, supra note 3, at 69. Sidak draws a parallel with the
Silicon Valley buyer cartel in United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc., which was deemed a per
se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 70 (citing No. 10-CV-1629, 2011 WL
10883994 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2011)). In his view, the sole difference between a buyer cartel
on labor and a buyer cartel on SEPs is that the former will create deadweight loss in the
short term, while the later will reduce output in the long term. Id. at 71–72.
55
See Thomas A. Lambert & Alden F. Abbott, Recognizing the Limits of Antitrust: The
Roberts Court Versus the Enforcement Agencies, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 791, 840–41
(2015).
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implications, and discuss its application to the IEEE-SA revised
patent policy.
Admittedly, the case law is not specific to SSOs, let alone to patents and intellectual property (“IP”) rights. Yet, given that EU
antitrust law observes the general principle of symmetry—
according to which antitrust law treats intellectual property as it
treats any other form of property56—there is no reason to segregate
SSO patent policies from the application of this body of cases. The
existence of specific agency guidelines on the matter does not modify the assessment.
A. EU Courts’ Case Law
EU antitrust law goes well beyond treating only horizontal
price-fixing as brazen violations of TFEU article 101. It is a widely
known state of affairs—and one often criticized in legal academia
and practice—that the first paragraph of TFEU article 101 catches
as restrictions “by object” (the legal equivalent of a per se infringement in U.S. antitrust law) many less patently anticompetitive forms of collusion.57 What may be less well understood, however, is that the CJEU case law generally considers any coordinated
conduct that interferes with the pricing system as a restriction by
object.58 Within the copious amount of CJEU case law on horizontal coordination, five cases are particularly relevant.59

56

See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (1995) (“[F]or the purpose of antitrust
analysis, the Agencies regard intellectual property as being essentially comparable to any
other form of property.”).
57
This includes various categories of exchange on strategic data. See Guidelines on the
Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to
Horizontal Co-Operation Agreements, 2011 O.J. (C 11) 1, ¶ 74 [hereinafter Guidelines on
the Applicability of Article 101] (“Information exchanges between competitors of
individuali[z]ed data regarding intended future prices or quantities should therefore be
considered a restriction of competition by object.”).
58
Id. ¶ 60.
59
One of these cases is not a court case, but a Commission decision. This Article
reviews it, nonetheless, because it is a transposition of an interesting GC judgment under
TFEU article 102.
THE
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1. FEDETAB
In Heintz van Landewyck SARL v. Commission of the European
Communities (also known as “FEDETAB”), the board of a nonprofit trade association with oversight of ninety-five percent of tobacco production in Belgium issued a recommendation to regulate
the wholesale and retail trades of cigarettes.60 The recommendation set out maximum discounts and minimum quantity requirements for cigarette distribution, uniform end-of-year rebates, and
standardized terms of payment (cash and specific credit periods).61
The Commission analyzed the recommendation as a restriction of
competition by object and effect, and declared it contrary to article
85 of the European Economic Community (“EEC”) Treaty,62
which later became TFEU article 101.63
On appeal before the CJEU, the applicants claimed that the
recommendation was not binding and that it could not, therefore,
possibly restrict competition.64 The court dismissed the allegation
on the facts, and sided with the Commission’s finding that the recommendation operated as a “genuine mandatory rule of conduct”
adopted by the major industry players sitting in FEDETAB’s
board.65 What is more, the court suggested that the question of the
formal mandatory nature of the recommendation was to some extent irrelevant.66 In the court’s view, as long as a substantial number of firms endorse the recommendation—the court wrote of
“compliance with the recommendation”—then the recommendation can be deemed to have a “profound influence on competition
in the market” and infringe TFEU article 101.67

60

See Joined Cases 209 to 215 & 218/78, Heintz van Landewyck SARL v. Comm’n,
1980 E.C.R. 3125, 3134–35.
61
See id. at 3138–39.
62
See Case IV/28.852, 29.127, 29.149—Fedetab, Comm’n Decision, 1978 O.J. (L 224)
29, ¶¶ 80–87.
63
See ALISON JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN, EU COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
MATERIALS 105 (6th ed. 2016).
64
See Joined Cases 209 to 215 & 218/78, Heintz van Landewyck SARL, at 3241–42.
65
See id. at 3250–51.
66
See id. at 3222.
67
See id. at 3250–51. The court also described the parties in the case as firms “who
control a substantial part of the total cigarette sales in Belgium.” Id.
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2. SCK and FNK
In the second case, Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf
(SCK) and Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanbedrijven (FNK) v.
Commission of the European Communities, Dutch firms that rent mobile cranes to the construction, petrochemical, and transport industries set up a trade association and a certification body under the
names SCK and FNK.68 At some point, FNK introduced a statutory requirement that its members charge “reasonable rates” for
both external crane hiring transactions vis-à-vis clients and internal
renting operations amongst members.69 In parallel, FNK sought to
give guidance on the meaning of “reasonable rates” by issuing internal rates for transactions amongst crane hiring firms, and by
publishing a handbook comprising cost calculations and recommended rates for transactions with external clients.70 The general
conditions established by FNK also contained conditions concerning prices, such as minimum rental hours, higher rates for Sundays
and holidays, and a prohibition of charging cancellation costs.71
The case was scrutinized by the Commission, which suspected
that the system operated as a facilitating device for horizontal collusion.72 During the administrative proceedings, a discussion took
place on the nature of the concept of “reasonable rates.”73 FNK
argued that its members were entirely free “to interpret the concept ‘reasonable.’”74 The Commission objected to this, noting that
“the reasonability of rates was discussed between the crane[hiring] companies and FNK” and that “FNK members were ob-

68

See Joined Cases T-213/95 & T-18/96, Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf
(SCK) and Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanbedrijven (FNK) v. Comm’n, 1997 E.C.R.
II-1739, ¶¶ 1, 4–5.
69
See id. ¶ 4. In the mobile cranes sector, it is common for crane hiring firms to
internally rent extra cranes from each other to serve clients, because this is more
attractive than purchase. See id. ¶ 2.
70
See id. ¶¶ 4, 23.
71
See Case IV/34.179, 34.202, 216—Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf and the
Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanverhuurbedrijven, Comm’n Decision, 1995 O.J. (L 312)
79, ¶ 10.
72
See id. ¶¶ 26–27.
73
See id. ¶ 20.
74
Id.
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liged under . . . the internal rules to charge ‘reasonable’ rates.”75
The Commission found that the “system of recommended and internal rates, which is intended to give substance to the concept of
‘reasonable rates’” falls within the scope of TFEU article
[101(1)].76
The facts suggest that the Commission’s concerns were not
with the requirement to set “reasonable rates.” Instead, its objections were to the mandatory measures taken to interpret the concept of reasonable rates, including the fixing of rates at a level superior to market rates.
On appeal, the parties challenged the Commission’s decision
on the ground that the recommended and internal “rates were intended to serve only as an aid to specific negotiations and had no
binding force at all.”77 The GC dismissed the argument.78 It held
that those rates which “give substance to the concept of reasonable
rates” were “in fact a pricing system binding its members.”79
Admittedly, SCK and FNK is a case that belongs to the horizontal price-fixing genre. That said, it suggests that the risk of antitrust liability increases when a trade association seeks to give binding force and substance to “reasonable rates” requirements.
3. Dole Food Company
In Dole Food Company, Inc. v. European Commission, four
worldwide producers of fresh fruit had coordinated their quotation
prices for bananas exported to the European Union.80 The Commission classified the infringement as a “cartel,” and imposed pe-

75

Id. The Commission concluded that the claim that they were “‘completely free’
when setting their rates [was] therefore inaccurate.” Id.
76
See id.
77
See Joined Cases T-213/95 & T-18/96, Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf
(SCK) and Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanbedrijven (FNK) v. Comm’n, 1997 E.C.R.
II-1739, ¶ 152.
78
Id. ¶ 157.
79
Id. ¶ 159. In the case at hand, the court went on to consider other factors, which
made the price system binding and akin to a “system of imposed prices.” See id. ¶ 164.
80
Case COMP/39.188—Bananas, Comm’n Decision (Oct. 15, 2008) (Summary at
2009 O.J. (C 189) 12), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/
39188/39188_2291_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3RL-CDWV].
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nalties totaling € 60.3 million (around $85 million at the time).81
The decision was first appealed to the GC,82 and then to the
CJEU.83 Both courts affirmed the Commission’s analysis in full
and dismissed the appeals.84
The theory of liability advanced in the Commission’s decision
was that the parties had unlawfully entertained “bilateral prepricing communications during which they discussed banana price
setting factors, that is factors relevant for setting of quotation prices for the upcoming week.”85 The problem, in the eyes of the
Commission and of the courts, was that this coordination was designed to “reduce uncertainty.”86
On closer examination, the impugned conduct had several original features. First, the case concerned quotation prices for bananas, not transaction prices, which were subsequently determined
through bilateral negotiations with customers.87 The Commission’s
decision spoke, in that respect, of “pre-pricing communications.”
Second, the parties were not engaged in discussions over quotation
prices, but over quotation price trends and “price setting factors,
that is factors relevant for setting of quotation prices.”88 Those
somewhat uncommon features—namely, the remoteness of the
conduct from market transactions and the abstract content of the
topics discussed—did not dissuade the Commission from pursuing

81

Id. ¶¶ 51–92, 492.
See Case T-588/08, Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Comm’n, ¶ 2 (Mar. 14, 2013),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=134981&doclang=EN
[https://perma.cc/5GJE-RFZR].
83
Case C-286/13 P, Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Comm’n, ¶ 1 (Mar. 19, 2015),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=163028&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=684009
[https://perma.cc/
NL9M-Y6K2].
84
See id. ¶¶ 1, 161.
85
See Case COMP/39.188, Bananas, ¶ 51.
86
See id. ¶ 54; C-286/13 P, Dole Food, ¶ 16.
87
See Case COMP/39.188, Bananas, ¶ 115 (stating that “quotation prices served at
least as market signals, trends and/or indications as to the intended development of
banana prices, and that they were relevant for the banana trade and the prices obtained”).
88
See id. ¶ 51; see also Case C-286/13 P, Dole Food, ¶ 14. In reality, the Commission
objected to both (i) price-setting factors, “and (ii) price trends and indications of
quotation prices for the forthcoming week before those quotation prices were set.” Id.
¶ 96.
82
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the case as a plain vanilla cartel, and qualifying the infringement as
a “restriction by object.”89
In their appeal before the CJEU, the parties challenged both
aspects.90 Their first argument was that “the subjects to which the
pre-pricing communications related was too general for it to be
possible, on that basis, for them to determine with certainty the
future conduct on the market.”91 They contended that “not all discussions concerning factors that might be relevant to price-setting
are sufficiently deleterious to merit classification as a restriction of
competition by object.”92 The CJEU disposed of the claim by holding that those communications “related to factors which had an
influence on supply vis-à-vis demand, market conditions and price
developments.”93
The applicants also argued that pre-pricing communications on
quotation price trends could not be deemed a restriction by object
because “quotation prices were far removed from actual prices.”94
The GC judgment had actually acknowledged that pre-pricing
communications on price-setting factors like the weather were
“innocuous.”95 The applicants thus argued that the mere fact that
pre-pricing communications “might have a certain influence on
prices is not sufficient to establish . . . restriction . . . by object.”96
The court, again, rejected this view.97 While the court addressed
the argument on quotation prices trends, insisting on their important role in the formation of actual prices, the court did not proceed
to explain the anticompetitive impact of communications on prepricing factors.98 Instead, the court took a more principled ap-

89

The case originated from a leniency application by Chiquita. See Case C-286/13 P,
Dole Food, ¶ 5.
90
Id. ¶¶ 86, 106.
91
Id. ¶ 86.
92
Id. ¶ 87.
93
Id. ¶ 97.
94
Id. ¶ 106.
95
Id. ¶ 109.
96
Id. ¶ 107.
97
Id. ¶ 134.
98
Id. ¶ 130 (“[Q]uotation prices were relevant to the market concerned, since, on the
one hand, market signals, market trends or indications as to the intended development of
banana prices could be inferred from those quotation prices, which were important for the
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proach, affirming somewhat discretionarily that “the pre-pricing
communications had the object of creating conditions of competition that do not correspond to the normal conditions on the market
and therefore gave rise to a concerted practice having as its object
the restriction of competition within the meaning of [TFEU article
101].”99
4. T-Mobile Netherlands
In T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, the five wireless communications operators in the Netherlands had shared information over remunerations paid to dealers.100 The case looked like a classic information
exchange, with the significant difference that the conspirators had
only met once to discuss dealers’ payments.101 The Dutch competition agency nonetheless issued fines.102 As the case progressed
through the Dutch appeals system, a court considered that the fact
that there had only been a “single meeting” called into question
the applicability of the implementation presumption which holds
that—in concerted practice cases where the burden of proof is discharged on the basis of circumstantial evidence—the existence of
an exchange of information can be presumed to influence the parties’ conduct on the market.103 It thus referred the case to the
CJEU, asking for clarification on whether the implementation presumption also applied in the case of an “isolated event,” or if, by
contrast, “a certain degree of regularity over a lengthy period” was
needed.104 The national court also sought to understand if an exchange of information which did not have the object of raising con-

banana trade and the prices obtained and, on the other, in some transactions the actual
prices were directly linked to the quotation prices.”).
99
Id. ¶ 134.
100
See Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Neth. BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse
Mededingingsautoriteit, 2009 E.C.R. I-04529, ¶¶ 10, 12–13.
101
See id. ¶ 12.
102
Id. ¶ 13.
103
Id. ¶ 21. With this, agencies and courts that apply TFEU article 101 can dispense
with an analysis of effects and dismiss defendants’ claims that their coordination was
ineffective. See id. ¶ 30.
104
Id. ¶ 22.
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sumer prices could nevertheless be deemed a restriction by object.105
Unsurprisingly, the court’s answer to the second question was
that “to find that a concerted practice has an anti-competitive object, there does not need to be a direct link between that practice
and consumer prices.”106 The wording of TFEU article 101 indeed
accommodates as restrictions by object any coordination that “directly or indirectly fix[es] purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions.”107
Perhaps less evidently, the court reaffirmed the implementation presumption even when the concerted practice is “isolated.”108 In the court’s view, it cannot be ruled out that a “meeting on a single occasion” may constitute a sufficient basis to distort
competition.109 The court then went on to explain that, in real markets, firms can seek “to concert action on a selective basis in relation to a one-off alteration in market conduct with reference simply
to one parameter of competition,” though one may question if such
thin coordination can effectively harm competition.110
5. Raw Tobacco Italy
In Raw Tobacco Italy, the Commission fined four processors of
raw tobacco who had operated a buyer cartel to reduce the prices
paid to farmers and intermediaries in Italy.111 The impugned conduct was garden-variety horizontal collusion, and included the joint
fixing of purchase prices, a mechanism of allocation of suppliers
and quantities and the exchange of confidential information.112 The
case attracted a great deal of attention in practitioners’ circles, as it
105

See id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 39.
107
Id. ¶ 37. Further, the facts showed that dealers’ remunerations were a “decisive
factor in fixing the price to be paid by the end user.” Id.
108
Id. ¶ 59. The parties remain entitled to try to rebut the presumption of
anticompetitive effects. See id.
109
Id.
110
Id. ¶ 60. The number of meetings is therefore irrelevant. See id. ¶ 61.
111
Case COMP/C.38.281/B.2—Raw Tobacco Italy, Comm’n Decision, ¶ 1 (Oct. 20,
2005) (Summary at 2006 (L 353) 45), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/
dec_docs/38281/38281_508_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XBA7-BVVB].
112
Id.
106
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was the first in which the Commission refused to grant immunity
to a leniency applicant who had subsequently divulged details of its
application to co-cartelists.113 On appeal, the EU court fully upheld
the Commission’s analysis.114
In addition to its buyer coordination aspects, the interest of this
decision for this Article lies in another, relatively unnoticed aspect.115 In the course of the administrative proceedings, some defendants attempted to justify some of their collusive activities on
the ground that they had sought to “eliminate the power that intermediaries could enjoy on the basis of their illegal activities,” including possibly “organi[z]ed crime” activity.116 Other raw tobacco
processors argued that they intended to “establish a transparent
auction system for the sale of tobacco which would have made the
purchase of raw tobacco more efficient and significantly reduced
the role of intermediaries.”117
The Commission dismissed both justifications on legal
grounds, paying no heed to the factual merits of the argument.118 In
the Commission’s view:
Serious infringements of [TFEU article [101(1)],
such as those described in this Decision, cannot be
justified by the aim to counteract third parties’ allegedly illegal conduct. It is clearly not the task of undertakings to take steps contrary to [TFEU article
101(1)] to counteract [behavior] which, rightly or
wrongly, they regard as illegal and/or contrary to
their own interests.119

113

See Case T-12/06, Deltafina SpA v. Comm’n, 2011 E.C.R. II-05639, ¶¶ 43–46.
See Case C-578/11 P, Deltafina SpA v. Comm’n, ¶ 95 (June 14, 2014), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=153583&pageIndex=0&doclang=e
n&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=827012 [https://perma.cc/YF35-YMGA].
115
That aspect is in relation to buyer coordination in auctions with intermediaries.
116
Case COMP/C.38.281/B.2, Raw Tobacco Italy, ¶ 287 & n.253.
117
Id. ¶ 288.
118
See id. ¶ 289.
119
Id.
114
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And the Commission went even further, mooting that such conduct could not even qualify for exemption under TFEU article
101(3).120
The point was not further discussed during the appeals that
took place before the EU courts. However, the Commission’s reasoning in Raw Tobacco Italy is an explicit transposition of the established case law of the EU courts in single firm conduct cases.121 In
Hilti AG v. Commission of the European Communities, the GC ruled
that a dominant firm cannot justify anticompetitive tying on
grounds of a perceived necessity to ensure product safety, when
specific laws and enforcement institutions exist to that effect.122
B. Normative Implications
All of the cases from this Article’s sample led the courts and
the Commission to affirm antitrust liability under TFEU article
101(1), and, in a majority of them, the impugned coordination was
formally qualified as a “restriction by object.”123 In EU antitrust
law, this is the closest one can come to the non-treaty notion of a
“cartel.” Despite their differences, each of the cases conveys legal
principles of relevance for the analysis of the changes introduced by
the IEEE-SA revised patent policy under EU antitrust law. This
section considers each in turn.

120

See id. ¶¶ 291–92 (“Had the processors genuinely intended to justify their [behavior]
on sound economic and legal arguments, they should have invoked the application of
Article 81(3) of the Treaty. In any event, there are no elements in the Commission’s file
indicating that [TFEU article 101(3)] could apply to the infringements described in this
Decision.”).
121
The Commission’s decision makes an analogy with the TFEU article 102 case law in
Hilti AG v. Commission of the European Communities, where the court held, in relation to a
dominant firm that was trying to justify an alleged abusive tying, that: “[T]here are laws
in the United Kingdom attaching penalties to the sale of dangerous products and to the
use of misleading claims as to the characteristics of any product. There are also
authorities vested with powers to enforce those laws. In those circumstances it is clearly
not the task of an undertaking in a dominant position to take steps on its own initiative to
eliminate products which, rightly or wrongly, it regards as dangerous or at least as inferior
in quality to its own products.” Case T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Comm’n, 1991 E.C.R. II-1439,
¶ 118.
122
See id. ¶ 119.
123
See supra Section II.A.
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SCK and FNK suggests that a trade association can lawfully introduce “reasonable rates” requirements.124 However, the ruling
also shows that the introduction of rate-related requirements paves
the way to the applicability of TFEU article 101(1), and the risk of
antitrust liability increases gradually as the trade association undertakes to give “substance” to rate-related requirements.125 In the
case at hand, the Commission easily found antitrust liability in light
of the direct coordination of trade association participants on quantitative rate levels (internal and recommended).126 But, this leaves
open the question of whether indirect coordination on rate-setting
factors or qualitative methodologies would have attracted antitrust
liability.
The answer to this question may be found in Dole Food.127 The
facts quoted in the opinion and judgments suggest that “by object”
restrictions occur when rivals coordinate their understanding of
abstract, non-quantitative factors like the weather, holiday periods,
and market trends, among other factors.128 In its decision, the
Commission objected in general and abstract terms to coordination
on “price setting factors,” which it defined as “factors influencing
supply vs. demand.”129 The parties in the proceedings actually ironized on this, noting that their coordination was referred in the industry as “radio banana.”130
Dole Food is also important because it held that “pre-pricing”
coordination suffices to trigger antitrust liability.131 In other words,
remote coordination well ahead of market transactions is a source
of TFEU article 101(1) exposure. T-Mobile Netherlands conveys a

124

See Joined Cases T-213/95 & T-18/96, Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf
(SCK) and Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanbedrijven (FNK) v. Comm’n, 1997 E.C.R.
II-1739, ¶ 159.
125
Id.
126
See id.
127
Case T-588/08, Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Comm’n, (Mar. 14, 2013), http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=134981&doclang=EN
[https://
perma.cc/5GJE-RFZR].
128
Id. ¶ 255.
129
See id. ¶¶ 294–95, 377.
130
Id. ¶ 195.
131
Id. ¶ 21.
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similar teaching, in the sense that early, one-off coordination can be
deemed a restriction of competition “by object.”132
Third, Raw Tobacco Italy133 serves as a reminder that objective
justifications are not in the cards when firms engage in “by object”
restrictions. To be more accurate, Raw Tobacco Italy transposes the
GC’s Hilti AG134 case law to the area of coordinated conduct. Under Hilti AG, firms cannot justify anticompetitive conduct by the
need to forestall the illegal behavior of others.135 In Hilti AG, the
court emphasized that such justifications are not available when
specific legal institutions and enforcement structures exist to remedy the illegality.136 In other words, this statement means that
firms cannot resort to (unlawful) anticompetitive private ordering
remedies like buyer coordination to curb (unlawful) anticompetitive supplier conduct.137 In more mundane terms, it is not the role
of firms to correct antitrust infringements through recourse to other antitrust infringement when specific regulatory institutions are
in place. Two wrongs do not make a right in antitrust law.
FEDETAB made the important point that nonbinding recommendations issued by representative institutions can give rise to a
restriction by object if they are endorsed by a sufficient number of
member firms.138 In other words, the greater the number of industry participants who decide to comply with the industry recommendation, the greater the risk of antitrust exposure.
Last, both T-Mobile Netherlands139 and Raw Tobacco Italy140
show that restrictions of competition by object can also originate at
132

See Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Neth. BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse
Mededingingsautoriteit, 2009 E.C.R. I-04529, ¶¶ 60–61.
133
Case COMP/C.38.281/B.2— Raw Tobacco Italy, Comm’n Decision (Oct. 20,
2005) (Summary at 2006 (L 353) 45), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/
dec_docs/38281/38281_508_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XBA7-BVVB].
134
Case T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Comm’n, 1991 E.C.R. II-1439.
135
See id. ¶ 118.
136
Id. ¶¶ 116–17.
137
For a discussion on when commercial parties will employ private ordering, see
generally Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive
Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328 (2004).
138
See Case IV/28.852, 29.127, 29.149—Fedetab, Comm’n Decision, 1978 O.J. (L 224)
29, ¶¶ 120–23.
139
See Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Neth. BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse
Mededingingsautoriteit, 2009 E.C.R. I-04529.
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the buyer level. While this point is not the most spectacular, it is
worth recalling, given the positive stance generally taken by antitrust policy toward buyer power.
All in all, there is a credible claim to make that TFEU article
101(1) prohibits, as a restriction by object, any coordinated interference with the price system. This strict legal regime is not unprecedented. It shares many similarities with the “rigid” situation that
prevailed in U.S. antitrust law after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1940
ruling in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.141 In this case, the
Supreme Court wrote in dicta that the Sherman Act condemned
any combination which tampers with the price system.142 The
Court wrote:
Any combination which tampers with price structures is
engaged in an unlawful activity. Even though the
members of the price-fixing group were in no position to control the market, to the extent that they
raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would be directly interfering with the free play of market forces.
The Act places all such schemes beyond the pale
and protects that vital part of our economy against
any degree of interference. Congress has not left
with us the determination of whether or not particular price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy
or destructive. It has not permitted the age-old cry
of ruinous competition and competitive evils to be a
defense to price-fixing conspiracies. It has no more
allowed genuine or fancied competitive abuses as a
legal justification for such schemes than it has the
good intentions of the members of the combination.143

140

See Case COMP/C.38.281/B.2—Raw Tobacco Italy, Comm’n Decision (Oct. 20,
2005) (Summary at 2006 (L 353) 45), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/
dec_docs/38281/38281_508_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XBA7-BVVB].
141
310 U.S. 150 (1940); see also ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC,
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 183–84 (4th ed. 1994).
142
Socony, 310 U.S. at 221.
143
Id. at 221–22 (emphasis added).
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Since then, courts have relaxed the Socony case law,144 but it is
interesting to note that no similar evolution—with anecdotal exceptions—seems to have taken place in EU competition law.145 In
contrast, in close intellectual proximity with the Supreme Court of
the 1940s, the EU courts have built an edifice of case law that
seems to repute as unlawful and a restriction by object any coordination that interferes with the free market price system.
Even the celebrated CJEU judgment in the 2014 case Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v. European Commission,146 which put an
144

Most commentators underline that Socony remains good law, yet they stress that the
Supreme Court has practically brought derogations by permitting defendants to raise rule
of reason type arguments. See, e.g., GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 141, at 195 (“Since
the late 1970s, with the notable exception of Maricopa, the Court’s horizontal pricing
jurisprudence has demonstrated a willingness to modify the traditional per se/rule of
reason dichotomy. At a minimum, BMI and NCAA authorize courts to expand the
characterization component of the traditional per se standard and explicitly entertain a
fuller assessment of defendants’ claims that the price-setting behavior has nontrivial
procompetitive merit.”); see also In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 703 F.3d 1004, 1012
(7th Cir. 2012) (“The plaintiffs retreat to the general language in the Socony-Vacuum
opinion, an opinion 72 years old and showing its age.”). Judge Posner proceeded to
examine the many relaxations brought to Socony by the Supreme Court’s case law. See id.
at 1012–14.
145
See, e.g., Case C-35/99, Arduino, 2002 E.C.R. I-1529, ¶¶ 37–38. In Arduino, for
instance, the court accepted the idea that the “public interest” may justify the fixing of
minimum and maximum prices by bar associations. Id. Further, even though this aging
case law has only been rarely applied, it is also true that the court has never taken steps to
reverse it and has occasionally referred to it in subsequent cases. Moreover, the recent
case law of the EU courts suggests that some coordinated interferences with the price
system deserve to be treated under the rule of reason. In the 2014 judgment in
MasterCard, Inc. v. European Commission, the CJEU found that the multilateral
interchange fees (“MIFs”) collectively set by the MasterCard payment system were
problematic because they reduced “the possibility of prices [for merchants] dropping
below a certain threshold.” Case C-382/12 P, MasterCard, Inc. v. Comm’n, ¶ 193 (Sept.
11, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157521&
pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=832893
[https://
perma.cc/JCV3-ZSZD]. Like the GC in MasterCard, however, the court scrutinized this
price interference under the rule of reason. See C-382/12 P, MasterCard, ¶ 129 (citing
Case T-111/08, MasterCard, Inc. v. Comm’n, ¶¶ 143, 163–164 (May 24, 2012),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
123081&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=833704
[https://perma.cc/XJD2-AHSG]. The court did not use the “restriction by object”
framework applied in other contemporary cases of coordinated interferences with the
price system. Id.
146
See Case C-67/13 P, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v. Comm’n, ¶ 58 (Sept. 11,
2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157516&
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end to the open-ended interpretation of the notion of a restriction
by object, is compatible with this Article’s understanding of the
case law. Admittedly, the strict liability rule applied to coordination
that tampers with the price system fits the Cartes Bancaires restricted scope requirement whereby the notion of restriction of
competition by object “can be applied only to certain types of coordination between undertakings which reveal a sufficient degree of
harm to competition,” so long as the court views such interferences with the price system as the supreme evil of antitrust.147
To conclude, this Article notes that its interpretation of coordinated interference with the price system as a restriction by object
also seems to be the Commission’s understanding. In a not so distant past the Commission held that railway companies active in the
“International Railways Union” had restricted competition by
jointly defining provisions “on the structure of sales prices” for rail
haulage and the “methods for determining such prices.”148 Even
though the price “structure established by the railway companies
[did] not directly concern haulage prices,” it nevertheless had “an
indirect effect on tariff levels.”149
C. Applied Analysis
At the outset, it seems uncontroversial to consider that the
IEEE-SA revised patent policy can be analogized to a price recommendation by an industry association, likely to trigger the applicability of TFEU article 101(1). However, at a deeper level of analysis, the definition of “reasonable rates” and the three factors listed
in the policy150 seem to constitute an attempt to “give substance”
to the content of the IEEE-SA’s FRAND commitment, which
pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=834032
[https://
perma.cc/ART3-VKH9] (“The concept of restriction of competition ‘by object’ can be
applied only to certain types of coordination between undertakings which reveal a
sufficient degree of harm to competition that it may be found that there is no need to
examine their effects . . . .”).
147
Id. (emphasis added).
148
See Case IV/34.494—Tariff Structures in the Combined Transport of Goods,
Comm’n Decision 1993 O.J. (L 73) 38, ¶¶ 11, 24.
149
Id. ¶ 25. The Commission accepted to exempt the agreement on the basis of a sector
specific legislative immunity that reinstated the applicability of article 101(3) TFEU. See
Council Regulation (EEC) 1017/68, 1968 O.J. (L 175) 1.
150
IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, supra note 1, at 2.
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gradually raises the risk of antitrust liability along the lines described in SCK and FCK.151 This is confirmed in the letter addressed by IEEE-SA to the DOJ in support of its request, which is
rife with references to the revised patent policy’s goal to “provide
greater clarity.”152
In addition, the fact that neither the concept of a reasonable
rate nor the three factors are given quantitative content is not sufficient to defuse the risk of antitrust liability, as clearly shown in Dole
Food.153 This point seemed critical in the DOJ assessment, which
noted that the revised patent policy did not impose “any specific
royalty calculation methodology.”154 In contrast, in EU antitrust
law, a shared understanding on mere pricing “considerations”
seems to merit severe antitrust scrutiny under article 101(1)
TFEU.155
A similar analysis applies to the fact that the actual definition of
licensing rates is “left to parties’ negotiations.”156 In its BRL, the
DOJ dismissed concerns of antitrust harm as “unlikely to occur as
a result of the [u]pdate given that, inter alia, licensing rates ultimately are determined through bilateral negotiations . . . .”157 As
seen above, EU antitrust law finds antitrust liability by object, even
if the coordination is too remote from market transactions to entitle
the parties to control the market price.158 In reality, mere interference with the free market price system seems to be a sufficient
151

See generally Joined Cases T-213/95 & T-18/96, Stichting Certificatie
Kraanverhuurbedrijf (SCK) and Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanbedrijven (FNK) v.
Comm’n, 1997 E.C.R. II-1739.
152
See Request, supra note 14, at 15, 18; see also Karachalios, supra note 15, at 6.
153
See Case C-286/13 P, Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Comm’n (Mar. 19, 2015),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=163028&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=684009
[https://perma.cc/
NL9M-Y6K2].
154
See BRL, supra note 2, at 12.
155
See supra Section II.A. The concept of other considerations in determining
“reasonable rates” is discussed in question 47 of the IEEE-SA’s FAQs. See
Understanding Patent Issues, supra note 13, at 15. Such coordination falls squarely within
the notion of “price setting factors” described in the Commission’s decision. See supra
Section II.A.3.
156
See Request, supra note 14, at 16.
157
See BRL, supra note 2, at 8.
158
See supra Sections II.A.3–4.
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concern to trigger a finding of restriction by object under TFEU
article 101(1).
Last, the contention that the IEEE-SA revised patent policy is
optional and can be disregarded by standards participants was perhaps relevant in the DOJ analysis, but has little significance from an
EU antitrust standpoint.159 As FEDETAB makes abundantly clear,
it is sufficient that the recommendation receives substantial endorsement from market participants.160 On the facts, this is manifestly the case, otherwise the policy would have never attracted a
majority of votes within the IEEE-SA governing bodies. Further,
the IEEE-SA website confirms that several large firms such as
Broadcom, Intel, and Samsung have already issued LOAs that were
deemed to comply with the revised patent policy.161
All this notwithstanding, this Article’s reasoning could be criticized on the ground that several of the cases cited concern secret
and direct communication between firms over pre-pricing factors,
and not public and indirect pricing recommendations within the
formal framework of a trade association. However, this objection is
not fatal. When a trade association declares that members A, B, and
C shall apply pricing principles X and Y, it is the same as having
market rivals A and B, and B and C, enter into secret contact to
agree that they will apply pricing principles X and Y.
In sum, the rulings of the EU courts point to an unlawful restriction by object when an industry association remotely recommends the application of qualitative pricing factors in future market
transactions.162 This suggests that the optimistic findings reached
by the BRL under U.S. antitrust law standards would not be exportable if the IEEE-SA revised patent policy were to be scrutinized under EU antitrust law. The reason for this is not a matter of
159
Patent holders may refuse to issue a LOA or to select the FRAND box on the LOA
form.
160
See Joined Cases 209 to 215 & 218/78, Heintz van Landewyck SARL v. Comm’n,
1980 E.C.R. 3125, ¶ 89.
161
These letters can be found on the IEEE-SA website. See IEEE-SA Records of IEEE
Standards-Related Patent Letters of Assurance for IEEE Standards 802–802.1 and
Amendments, IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD: PATCOM, https://standards.ieee.org/about/
sasb/patcom/pat802.html [https://perma.cc/692F-64VC] (last visited Nov. 22, 2016).
162
Also, the possible justification to avert otherwise unlawful anticompetitive conduct
is not available.
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facts, but law. In the EU, a cartel-type prohibition rule applies to
any coordination that interferes with the price system.163
Beyond IEEE-SA, the case law of the EU courts more generally
creates a serious risk of antitrust exposure for SSOs that contemplate similar changes to their patent policy. To be sure, the argument here is not that EU antitrust agencies would—let alone
should—take action against SSOs patent policies for infringement
of TFEU article 101,164 or that the EU antitrust agencies would not
use their margin of discretion to dismiss complaints against SSOs,
settle such cases, or extend the benefit of an exemption under
TFEU article 101(3). On the contrary, major world antitrust agencies have generally cast a favorable eye on such changes. In 2006,
the DOJ issued a BRL, finding no need to challenge VMEbus International Trade Association’s (“VITA”) new patent policy,
which prescribed a commitment by working group members to declare “the maximum royalty rates and most restrictive non-royalty
terms.”165 In 2010, the Commission took exactly the same position
in its guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements.166 The
163

And this holds true regardless of its remoteness, ineffectiveness, or whether it is
excusable. See Case T-588/08, Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Comm’n, ¶ 653 (Mar. 14, 2013),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=134981&doclang=EN
[https://perma.cc/5GJE-RFZR].
164
An interesting and thought-provoking question would be to determine whether a
standards participant could apply to the Commission for immunity under the leniency
notice.
165
See Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Robert A. Skitol, Drinker, Biddle & Reath LLP (Oct. 30, 2006) [hereinafter VITA BRL]
(on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal).
VITA requested a business review letter from the U.S. DOJ. See Letter from Robert A.
Skitol & Kenneth M. Vorrasi, Drinker, Biddle & Reath LLP, to Thomas O. Barnett,
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (June 15, 2006) (on file with the Fordham
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal). The DOJ recalled the
procompetitive effects of collaborative standard-setting processes. See VITA BRL, supra,
at 7. It noted the potential of standard setting to generate exclusionary and collusive
effects, which could be found to harm competition. Id. In light of this, the DOJ undertook
an analysis of the new patent policy under the rule of reason. Id. at 8. The DOJ eventually
issued the business review letter finding no cause for antitrust concern. Id. at 10. It
nonetheless called VITA, the VITA Standards Organization, and its member companies
“vigilantly to continue to educate working group participants about the severe
consequences of such activities.” Id.
166
See Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101, supra note 57, ¶ 299 (“[S]hould a
standard-setting organi[z]ation’s [intellectual property rights] policy choose to provide
for [intellectual property rights] holders to individually disclose their most restrictive
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Commission additionally stated in a footnote that, in its view, the
prohibition of TFEU article 101 did not prevent IPR holders to individually take “the decision to license [intellectual property
rights] essential to a standard on royalty-free terms;”167 though this
statement of forbearance came with the caveat that this “should
not serve as a cover to jointly fix prices either of downstream products or of substitute [intellectual property rights]/technologies.”168
Instead, this Article’s point is that regardless of the policy preferences expressed by antitrust agencies, changes of the kind introduced by the IEEE-SA should be given serious consideration under
the case law adopted pursuant to TFEU article 101. Courts and arbitration tribunals dealing with patent infringement cases, patent
damages litigation, or rate-setting proceedings could indeed be
faced with a new form of competition defense (or counter-defense),
raised by SEP holders who do not comply with an SSO’s patent
policy—e.g., a SEP holder requests royalties that reflect the added
value of the end product—to avoid the consummation of an unlawful restriction of competition by object within the meaning of
TFEU article 101. For example, an unlicensed implementer subject
to injunction proceedings may argue in defense that the SEP owner
has violated the IEEE-SA patent policy by bringing infringement
proceedings following the failure of negotiations based on a proposed rate that is unreasonable in view of the new definition. A
possible counter-defense by the SEP owner could be that the IEEESA definition of “reasonable rates” in not enforceable, given its
contrariety with TFEU article 101.
Interestingly, the risk of violation of TFEU article 101(1) could
also offer a retrospective explanation for the CJEU’s conservative
ruling in Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp.169 In his opinion

licensing terms, including the maximum royalty rates they would charge, prior to the
adoption of the standard, this will normally not lead to a restriction of competition within
the meaning of [a]rticle 101(1).”).
167
Id. ¶ 274 n.109.
168
Id. ¶ 299 n.124. In other words, the decision to license on royalty-free terms shall
remain individual, and firms shall not jointly decide that licensing must take place on a
royalty-free basis.
169
See Case C-170/13, Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp., ¶ 77 (July 16, 2015),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=165911&pageIndex=
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to the court, Advocate General Wathelet suggested that the court
invite SSOs “to establish minimum conditions or a framework of
‘rules of good conduct’ for the negotiation of FRAND licensing
terms.”170 In its judgment, the CJEU did not follow the invitation,
possibly in light of the inconsistency between such a pronouncement and the court’s case law under TFEU article 101(1).171
In sum, in the United States, the main antitrust concern that
scholars have leveled at the IEEE-SA revised patent policy is one of
buyer collusion. In the European Union, a less facts-dependent
standard of liability applies, with the result that the risk of antitrust
liability under European law is considerably higher for SSOs that
consider changes of the kind introduced by the IEEE-SA revised
patent policy.
III. RATIONALE: INCIPIENCY THEORY
EU competition law brings any coordinated interference with
the price system under a quasi per se prohibition rule, similar to the
standard of liability applied in cartel cases under U.S. law. Perhaps
no other case conveys this philosophy better than the Dole Food decision, where the fact that the impugned coordination had “an influence on supply vis-à-vis demand” was deemed sufficient to find
a restriction by object.172
This strict legal standard is presumably based on deeper legal
and economic considerations. Unfortunately, however, the CJEU
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=51500 [https://perma.cc/G8SGELT6].
170
See Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp.,
C-170/13 ¶ 11 (Nov, 20, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
docid=159827&doclang=EN [https://perma.cc/FVY2-C28S]. The opinion further
continued: “Without these, not only actions for a prohibitory injunction but also the rules
on abuse of a dominant position, which should be employed only as solutions of last
resort, are being used as a negotiating tool or a means of leverage by the SEP-holder or the
undertaking which implements the standard and uses the teaching protected by that
SEP.” Id.
171
See Case C-170/13, Huawei, ¶ 77.
172
Case C-286/13 P, Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Comm’n, ¶¶ 97, 107 (Mar. 19, 2015),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=163028&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=684009
[https://perma.cc/
NL9M-Y6K2].
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has not explicitly elaborated the intellectual roots of this strict regime, in line with its customary practice of stating what the law is,
without articulating why this law is justified.173 In this Article’s
view, a plausible foundation for the EU courts’ strict regime is the
“incipiency theory” which, again, can be traced to early U.S. antitrust law.174 Under the incipiency theory, the antitrust structure
should seek to arrest anticompetitive conduct in its incipiency, before it expands into a full-fledged restriction of competition.175 As
U.S. antitrust experts Robert H. Bork and Ward S. Bowman once
colorfully explained in relation to U.S. antitrust law, the theory is
based on the “idea that it is possible to nip restraints of trade and
monopolies in the bud before they blossom to Sherman Act proportions.”176 Put differently, the incipiency theory seeks to provide an
anticipative remedy for conduct that presents a “dangerous likelihood” of anticompetitive infringement if and when “fully
grown.”177 The incipiency theory does not catch only finite forms
of conduct that are yet to produce anticompetitive effects, but also
infinite forms of conduct that pose an even more distant threat to
competition.178 The foundations of this extraordinarily precautionary enforcement theory are still discussed in modern antitrust
scholarship.179 Some rationalize it on economic grounds, considering that incipiency is designed for cases of firm conduct that knowingly yields a “dangerous probability” of anticompetitive ef173
This can be described as “it-is-so-because-we-say-so” jurisprudence. See Webster v.
Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 552 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
174
See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
175
See Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
363, 368 (1965).
176
Id. For a critique, see Olivier E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 27 (1968) (noting that “while Bork and
Bowman may be correct in charging that scale economy justifications have not been given
sufficient weight in the recent enforcement of the merger law, they are also guilty of a
certain heavy-handedness in their own treatment of the incipiency question”).
177
See Jesse W. Markham, Lessons for Competition Law from the Economic Crisis: The
Prospect for Antitrust Responses to the “Too-Big-to-Fail” Phenomenon, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L., 261, 295 (2011).
178
See Thomas Dahdouh, Section 5, the FTC and Its Critics: Just Who Are the Radicals
Here?, 20 COMPETITION: J. ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETITION L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 1, 14
(2011).
179
See, e.g., id.
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fects.180 Others argue that incipiency is justified in all cases of firm
conduct that challenges the political objectives of antitrust law
(preservation of a self-policing system, individual freedom, etc.).181
The incipiency theory is the bedrock of several U.S. antitrust
statutes including section 7 of the Clayton Act182 and the Celler Kefauver Act, which set out a merger control system;183 section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, which outlaws trade restraints
that threaten to become a Sherman Act violation;184 and section 2
of the Sherman Act, which declares unlawful attempted monopolization.185 Some authors actually refer to those pieces of legislation
as the “incipiency statutes.”186
The incipiency theory has also been influential in U.S. case law.
In a series of cases, U.S. courts have relied on incipiency theory to
extend antitrust liability to conduct with benign anticompetitive
potential. The incipiency theory is, in particular, the foundation of
a controversial line of opinions where the Supreme Court enjoined
mergers with limited market coverage.187 It is also the theoretical
180

See Markham, supra note 177, at 295 (“Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to
produce a result which the law seeks to prevent—for instance, the monopoly—but
require further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass, an
intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability that it
will happen. But when that intent and the consequent dangerous probability exist, this
statute, like many others and like the common law in some cases, directs itself against that
dangerous probability as well as against the completed result.” (citation omitted) (citing
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905))).
181
See Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
377, 382–83 (1965); Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009
U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 525.
182
See Steven C. Salop, Symposium on Mergers and Antitrust, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4
(1987); Note, “Preliminary Preliminary” Relief Against Anticompetitive Mergers, 82 YALE
L.J. 155, 170 (1972).
183
See Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1225
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012)); Stucke, supra note 181, at 525 (“Seeking,
with mixed results, to break up the German cartels, the United States after World War II
domestically strengthened its merger laws to arrest concentration of economic might in
its incipiency.”).
184
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); see also Luca Fiorito, When Economics Faces the Economy: John
Bates Clark and the 1914 Antitrust Legislation, 25 REV. POL. ECON. 139, 159 (2013).
185
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
186
See, e.g., Markham, supra note 177, at 296.
187
See United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 304 (1966); United States v.
Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362–63 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
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backbone of the case law that affirms a per se prohibition rule
against all cartels, including those that are ineffective at affecting
market conditions due to lack of market power. Law professors
Harlan M. Blake and William K. Jones explained that, in those cases, the courts acted on the “supposition that an ineffective cartel
would eventually correct its mistakes and expand its efforts to embrace or crush any troublesome outside competition.”188 Finally,
the incipiency theory has also inspired the—now reversed—per se
prohibition of resale price maintenance, by analogy to horizontal
price-fixing agreements, but without proof of market control.189
In modern U.S. antitrust law, the influence of the incipiency
doctrine in the case law has receded. Amongst others, progress in
economic theory throughout the twentieth century has weakened
the early consensus that ascribed deleterious effects to a wide range
of business practices.190 This openness to economic reasoning is
what presumably motivated the Supreme Court to overrule the in-

U.S. 294, 346 (1962); see also Robert H. Lande, Resurrecting Incipiency: From Von’s
Grocery to Consumer Choice, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 875 (2001).
188
See Blake & Jones, supra note 181, at 386. However, this is disputed. See Robert H.
Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65 COLUM. L. REV., 401, 414 n.16 (1965).
189
Blake & Jones, supra note 181, at 386 n.32; see also Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 384–85 (1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prod.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). In Dr. Miles, the Court wrote:
As to this, the complainant can fare no better with its plan of identical
contracts than could the dealers themselves if they formed a
combination and endeavored to establish the same restrictions, and
thus to achieve the same result, by agreement with each other. If the
immediate advantage they would thus obtain would not be sufficient
to sustain such a direct agreement, the asserted ulterior benefit to the
complainant cannot be regarded as sufficient to support its system.
But agreements or combinations between dealers, having for their
sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices,
are injurious to the public interest and void. They are not saved by the
advantages which the participants expect to derive from the enhanced
price to the consumer. . . . The complainant’s plan falls within the
principle which condemns contracts of this class. It, in effect, creates
a combination for the prohibited purposes. No distinction can
properly be made by reason of the particular character of the
commodity in question.
See id.
190
See Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern
Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 734 (2012).
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cipiency treatment of resale price maintenance in Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.
To be sure, the incipiency statutes remain in force. But when
they are applied, agencies and courts embrace an effects-based approach, which gauges prospective risks of consumer harm on a
case-by-case basis.191 Even the per se prohibition rule on pricefixing192 has given way to a structured analysis, whereby pricefixing is no longer prohibited on its face, but is subject to a “quick
look” examination of the relevant facts which determines its subsequent treatment under the law.193 As the Supreme Court noted in
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., “[w]hen
two partners set the price of their goods or services they are literally ‘price fixing,’ but they are not per se in violation of the Sherman
Act.”194
Against this background, the incipiency theory could be the
implicit rationale that underpins the strict case law of the EU
courts in relation to remote, indirect and peripheral interferences
with the price system.195 This interpretation acknowledges that
coordinated interferences with the price system may not be presently anticompetitive, but that they, nonetheless, deserve to be
prohibited on the ground that they move participating firms one
step closer to unlawful price coordination (and one step away from
independent competitive pricing).
The case law of the EU courts under TFEU article 101(1) lends
itself quite well to an incipiency theory reading. The per se prohibition of isolated coordination in T-Mobile Netherlands196 can be rationalized on the ground of the need to attack collusion in its infancy. Similarly, the finding of an infringement for unlawful pre-

191

David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 749 (2001).
192
See Louis Kaplow, On The Meaning of Horizontal Agreement in Competition Law, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 683, 683 (2011).
193
See Gavil, supra note 190, at 751.
194
441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979).
195
See Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW.
U. L. REV. 281, 281 (1956).
196
See Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Neth. BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse
Mededingingsautoriteit, 2009 E.C.R. I-04529.
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pricing communications in Dole Food197 shares the same spirit. Finally, the spectacular reversal of the case law on de minimis restrictions of competition in Expedia Inc. v. Autorité de la concurrence may
be reasoned on the basis of incipiency theory.198 In Expedia, the
CJEU affirmed dicta that restrictions by object were presumed to
appreciably affect competition,199 reversing a decades old
precedent and discarding the laxer principle affirmed in the Commission’s 2001 de minimis notice.200 In the court’s view, a price
fixing arrangement covering two percent of a market is “by its nature and independently of any concrete effect” an “appreciable
restriction on competition.”201
Pushing the incipiency hypothesis further, two declinations of
the theory can be potentially envisioned. On the one hand, coordinated interference with the price system may be looked at as a first
stage, preliminary measure that forms part of a larger plan to cartelize an industry. This ties in with eighteenth century classical economist Adam Smith’s famous quote: “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”202 In this hypothesis, the narrative is that
rivals that initially cooperate may be naturally and irremediably
brought to adopt additional anticompetitive arrangements.
On the other hand, coordinated conduct that interferes with the
price system may be seen as a facilitating device or plus factor,
which raises risks of tacit collusion amongst interdependent oligo197

See C-286/13 P, Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Comm’n, ¶ 1 (Mar. 19, 2015),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=163028&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=684009
[https://perma.cc/
NL9M-Y6K2].
198
Case C-226/11, Expedia, Inc. v. Autorité de la concurrence, ¶ 36 (Dec. 13, 2012),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=131804&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=54095 [https://perma.cc/42YRBHU9].
199
Id. ¶ 37.
200
Id. ¶ 38. This precedent is Case C-5/69, Franz Volk v. S.P.R.L. Ets J. Vervaecke,
1969 E.C.R. I-00295.
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Case 226/11, Expedia, ¶ 37.
202
See 2 ADAM SMITH, THE GLASGOW EDITION OF THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE
OF ADAM SMITH: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 145 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1976).
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polists through, for instance, a reduction of market uncertainty. In
this variant, the narrative is economic, and it focuses on a presumed risk of anticompetitive effects that stems from the facilitating device.
On a cursory analysis, both narratives could explain the classification of the IEEE-SA revised patent policy as a restriction by object. First, one can recall that the IEEE-SA changed its patent policy in 2007 in order to entitle patent holders to disclose their proposed maximum rates and other terms.203 As admitted by IEEE-SA
in its request for a BRL, it is precisely the failure of this policy that
prompted the SSO to adopt a revised patent policy in 2015 which
sets up a more comprehensive system.204 This evolution fits well
with the Smithian incipiency theory narrative, which encapsulates
the—gloomy—conjecture that any competitor coordination is
doomed to progress towards price fixing.205 Second, the various
documents adopted by the IEEE-SA to explain its revised patent
policy focus on the avowed aim of providing “clarification” and
resolving an alleged problem of “uncertainty.”206 Given that participants in IEEE-SA working groups are also often rival oligopolists in manufacturing markets, it is not wholly heretical to adopt a
rule that finds antitrust liability for measures that increase transparency in concentrated markets, though it may be overly crude to
use the “restriction by object” approach.207
At this stage of the discussion, Dole Food208 is again useful, because it provides hints on which of the two incipiency narratives
does not drive the case law interpreting TFEU article 101(1). The
facts discussed by the Commission and the EU courts reveal that
the quotation prices on which the impugned pre-pricing communications took place were “not closely correlated” with actual trans203

See Request, supra note 14, at 10.
See id.
205
See SMITH, supra note 202.
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eds., 2013).
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action prices.209 Moreover, the existence of import quotas on bananas limited the parties’ ability to influence the total quantities supplied in the EU, and in turn, their power to raise prices.210 Those
facts suggest that the parties’ pre-pricing communications on quotation prices were quite unlikely to ever “ripen” into anticompetitive coordination.211 While it treated the conduct as a restriction by
object, the Commission explicitly acknowledged this by granting a
sixty percent reduction on the fine inflicted to the parties:
The fact that during the relevant period the banana
sector was subject to a very specific regulatory regime is taken into consideration, in [favor] of all the
parties, as a mitigating circumstance as well as that
the coordination related to the quotation prices. In
light of the very particular circumstances of this
case, a reduction of [sixty percent] is applied to the
basic amount of the fines for all the parties.212
The Commission’s leniency vis-à-vis a restriction by object implicitly means that the pre-pricing communications were not
treated as an incipient infringement because of the economic risk
that they would facilitate collusive pricing. Instead, the incipiency
theory that possibly underpins the court’s case law may be closer to
the Smithian narrative which proposes to outlaw competitor cooperation on price in the cradle, before it grows into plain vanilla
price fixing.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that the evolution of the general EU antitrust case law on horizontal coordination under TFEU article 101
creates a risk of antitrust liability for SSO policies that attempt to
give substance to the concept of reasonable rates and guidelines on
209

See id. ¶ 432 (noting that “the Commission recogni[z]es itself quotation prices are
not closely correlated to actual prices”).
210
See id. ¶ 301.
211
For use of the word, see Ward S. Bowman Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 30 (1957).
212
Case COMP/39.188—Bananas, Comm’n Decision, ¶ 470–76 (Oct. 15, 2008)
(Summary at 2009 O.J. (C 189) 12), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/
dec_docs/39188/39188_2291_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3RL-CDWV].
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rate-setting factors. The intellectual foundation of this may be a
belief by the EU courts that, in a market economy, the free market
price system must remain untouched. Accordingly, the TFEU article 101 case law treats as a “restriction by object” any coordination that tampers with the price system.213 In practice, coordinated
conduct is thus deemed on its face to be incompatible with the first
paragraph of TFEU article 101,214 and unlikely to benefit from an
exemption under the third paragraph of TFEU article 101.
While SSOs should not be too worried about the risk of antitrust enforcement by the EU Commission or other national competition agencies in light of their stated policy preferences, SSOs
should nonetheless remain cautious. Due to the direct effect of the
EU competition rules, national courts involved in patent litigation
may be called upon to assess the validity of SSOs’ patent policies
under TFEU article 101. And in this context, the policy preferences expressed by antitrust agencies occupy little, if no, place in
the assessment.
In the past decade, antitrust agencies have repeatedly invited
SSOs to define and clarify the meaning of FRAND commitments.215 In light of the EU courts’ case law, those invitations may
have counterintuitively created an antitrust trap for SSOs. In brief,
while SSOs initiatives to refine their patent policies will certainly
be viewed with sympathy by some antitrust agencies outside of Europe—as the DOJ BRL shows—they may trigger findings of antitrust liability in the courts of the old continent.
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